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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAJ.'WA SANDBERG; WANDA SANDBERG, 
Administratrix of the ESTATE OF 
WAYNE SANDBERG, Deceased; JEFFREY 
SCOTT SANDBERG; SUSAN SANDBERG, 
by WA..~DA SANDBERG, her Guardian, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROBERT D. KLEIN, AVALON KLEIN, ) 
JANE DOE and all other persons ) 
unknown claiming any right, title ) 
or interest in the real property ) 
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint ) 
adverse to Plaintiffs' Ownership ) 
or any cloud upon Plaintiffs' ) 
title thereto, ) 
AND 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
In the Matter of the ESTATE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
OF 
WAYNE SANDBERG, 
Deceased. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 15146 
Case No. 15274 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT AND ON APPEAL TO DATE 
In light of Respondents' statement that a procedural 
irregularity exists in this appeal, Appellants will bring 
the Court current on and clarify the relevant procedural 
history of this case, both in the lower court and on appeal. 
(Respondents' Brief, hereinafter RB, at 4) 
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Appellants filed this action in the Fifth Judicial 
District seeking to quiet title to lands which Respondent 
Klein claimed he had purchased pursuant to an a) lPged exerche 
of an Option Agreement. (R. 1) Klein counterclaimed for 
specific performance. (R. 166) 
Both parties filed summary judgment motions under 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. The motions were heard on March 15, 1977, 
Judge Don V. Tibbs temporarily presiding. 
On March 24, 1977, Judge Tibbs signed an Order, 
docketed on March 25, which contained Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Lav a.id ultimately decreed specific perform-
ance in favor of the Respondents in conformance with a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract submitted by Respondents. (R. 358, 
324) The Order further instructed Respondents, the prevailing 
~ to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
conformity with Respondents' Affidavit which the lower court 
specifically found constituted "a true and correct statement 
of the facts". (R. 359) 
On Thursday, April 7, 1977, Respondents mailed a 
set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law grossly 
inconsonant to those "facts" found by the court in March. 
Sua sponte, Respondents submitted a second Order and Judgment 
and Decree of Specific Performance. Appellants' counsel and 
the lower court received these documents on Monday, April 11, 
19"/7. That same day Appellants' counsel learned that the 
additional Findings and Conclusions and second Judgment had 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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been irrunediately signed by the court. (Transcript May 25, 
1977, 6:14-16; 8:19-21; R. 368; R. 369-391) 
On April 15, 1977, Appellants appealed the original 
Order of Specific Performance docketed on March 25, 1977.l/ 
(R. 363) Simultaneously and consistent with Rule 52(b) 
U.R.C.P., Appellants filed an objection to the Findings of 
Facts and Conclusions of Law proposed by Respondent. (R. 361; 
see also attachment to Clerk's Certificate filed June 16, 
1977 in Case No. 15146) 
Though the Notice of Appeal filed April 15, 1977 
indicated the appeal was solely from the Order of Specific 
Performance signed on Harch 24, Respondents convinced the 
lower court that the filing of the notice had divested it of 
jurisdiction to hear Appellants' objections to the second 
set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and second 
Order and Decree. (R. 363; Transcript May 25, 1977 3:17-22; 
Minute Entry attached to Clerk's Certificate filed June 16, 
1977 in No. 15146)~/ Despite the lower court's holding that 
it had no jurisdiction after April 15, 1977, Respondents' 
set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
second Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance 
were docketed on April 19, 1977. (R. 369, 386) 
The irregular presence of the two conclusive 
Orders and two separate sets of Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, resulted in Appellants' perfection of two 
independent appeals. 
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<) 
In late July, Appellants obtained special permission, 
pursuant to Rule 7S(p)(:l) U.R.C.P., and fjled an enlarged 
brief in the appeal from the original Order. Re~~ondents 
have described that brief as a conglomeration of legal 
"technicalities, niceties, arguments and sophistry". (RB SO) 
In August Respondents moved to dismiss both appeals. 
On September 6, 1977, this Court denied those motions, 
instead consolidating, sua sponte, Case Numbers 15146 and 
15274 for appeal. 
As the consolidation occurred more than one month 
after Appellants filed their brief, a section in this Reply 
Brief will briefly correlate the arguments of that earlier 
brief with the second set of Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific 
Performance.l/ See Table I, Appendix. 
RELIEF SOUGHT AND GROUNDS THEREOF 
Appellants contend that at the very least that 
Court must vacate the summary judgment and remand this case 
for trial, inasmuch as there are unresolved fact issues 
material to the legal issues on which the lower court based 
its judgment. Among these are: 
1. Did Mrs. Sandberg "excuse" the timely, proper 
exercise of the option? 
2. Here Mr. Klein's acts sufficient to find part 
performance to take the contract out of the Statute of 
Fr aucls? . 
3. Did Mr. Kl2in tender proper consideration? 
4. Does Mr. Klein have clean hands requisite to 
seeking equitable relief? 
-4-
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5. Can an unaided surveyor locate one definite 
parcel of land using the land descriptions in the 
various documents before the Court? 
6. Where are the physical reference points 
referred to in the various documents? 
7. Did Mr. Klein exercise as to all or part of 
the property? 
Clearly, these issues, decided in favor of Respond-
ents by the lower court were both factually contested and 
material. As such, they should be resolved by a trier of 
fact. Hellstrom v. D. A. Osguthorpe, 22 Utah 2d 440, 455 
P.2d 28 (1969). In Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. 
United Resources, Inc. 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970), 
this Court said: 
It is thus clear from the rule that when upon the basis 
of the pleadings, depositions, answers ~< * ~<, admissions 
and affidavits, which we herein refer to as 'submis-
sions,' a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, the motion for summary judgment shall be granted. 
But if it appears from such submissions that there is 
a dispute as to any issue of fact which would be 
determinative of the rights of the parties, it should 
be denied and tri·al should be had to resolve the 
disputed issues. 24 Utah 2d at 348 (emphasis added) 
This Court in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d l, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), amplified 
the Transamerica language as follows: 
A sunnnary judgment must be supported by evidence, 
admissions and inferences which when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the loser, shows that there is 
no ~enuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.' Such showing must preclude all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a 
judgment in his favor. (11 Utah 2d at 4-5) (emphasis 
added) 
-5-
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Thus, to sustain the lower court's judgment, this 
Court must not only make findings consistent with those made 
in the luwer court bu~ further find that as to these facts 
there was no issue, completely prejudging Appellants' version 
of the facts as having no credibility or weight, without the 
benefit of a trial. Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah 
2d 415, 464 P.2d 580 (1970); Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 
2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967). 
Beyond the existence of material fact issues, 
Appellants contend that several legal issues are decisive 
and allow this Cpurt to avoid remand and simply reverse and 
enter judgmen·_-; in Appellants' favor. Among these are: 
1. That Respondents have failed to exercise the 
option, which required timely submission of a real 
estate contract. 
2. That the option required future agreement of 
the parties and was not complete and thus incapable of 
specific performance. 
3. That the consideration tendered and to be paid 
under the contract is not in conformity with the option. 
4. That the documentary evidence pled in Respond-
ents' counterclaim is insufficient to support a contract 
under the Statute of Frauds. 
Appellants firmly believe that these legal issues, 
as to which there are no disputed facts, compel a reversal 
and entry of judgment on behalf of Appellants. If that is 
not done, this Court, viewing the submissions in a light 
-
most favorable to the Appellants, 111ust find that there are 
unresolved issues of material fact which should be deter-
mined by a trial. 
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POINT I 
THE SCOPE OF REVIEW ENCOMPASSES BOTH LAW AND FACT 
Respondents apparently agree (1) that the Supreme 
Court in an equitable proceeding is charged with reviewing 
both factual and legal issues; (2) that Summary Judgments do 
not enjoy the normal presumptions attributable to findings 
and judgments made after trial; and (3) that all inferences 
are to be drawn in favor of the losing party below. (RB 13) 
Nonetheless, Respondents suggest that this Court should now 
make an exception and "concern itself only with the legal 
issues, notwithstanding its power to review the facts in 
equity cases," due primarily to Appellants' failure to treat 
the second findings in their original brief. (RB 15) 
Respondents further interpret the language in an exchange 
between Judge Tibbs and Appellants' counsel, Mr. Thompson, 
as a stipulation and waiver of trial. (Id.) Appellants deny 
that this was thei.r intent, and further contend that Respond-
ents' assertions are without both factual foundation and 
judicial precedent. 
Respondents' suggestion that this Court not review 
the facts is bottomed in the lower court's express finding 
that the prevailing parties' self-serving affidavit, not the 
losers' assertions, constituted "a true and correct state-
ment of the facts." (R. 359) To suggest, therefore, that 
this Court not exercise its "power" to review the facts is 
to ask that this Court to shirk a self-imposed duty. 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). That 
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suggestion, contrary to long-accepted standards of appellate 
review,'±/ should serve as a forewarning Lhat the "facts" 
cannot be sustained by a careful scrutiny of the pleadings, 
submissions, and contentions of the parties. 
POINT II 
THE SECOND SET OF FINDINGS OF FACT /u~D 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAH IS INVALID, IMPROPER, 
AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVLDENCE 
A. The Second Findings and Conclusions are Entitled 
to Little, if Any, Weight. 
Respondents' brief notes that Appellants have not 
specifically attacked any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions 
of Law entered April 19, 1977, claiming that, as a result, 
they are unchallenged. For several reasons, Appellants did 
not treat the April 19 findings and conclusions in their 
original brief. 
First, the Order initially appealed from contained 
its own findings and conclusions, and completely resolved 
the issues. Judicially drafted, Appellants felt that its 
three pages were entitled to more weight than the seventeen 
page self-serving document proferred by Respondents. Further, 
whereas the judge simply found the Option Agreement clear, 
unambigous, and properly exercised, Respondents' findings 
also find waiver of defective exercise, estoppel against the 
assertion of those defects, if any, and part performance, 
all of which are both unnecessary and contradictory to the 
prior findings. Obviously, Respondent has made his own 
findings and drawn his own conclusions, rather than merely 
drafting them in accordance with '.~he judicially pronounced 
-8-
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viewpoint.~/ The practice has been condemned, and in the 
instant case ubiquitously granted the Respondents the plenary 
powers to protect their record. As noted in Kentucky Milk 
Mktg. v. Borden, 456 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1969): 
We do not condemn this practice in instances where the 
court is utilizing the services of the attorney only in 
order to complete the physical task of drafting the 
record. However, to the extent that the court dele-
gates its power to make findings of fact and draw 
conclusions this is not good practice .... Especially 
after the court has indicated by its orders a final 
disposition of the case. 
To permit counsel to clutter up the record by filing 
detailed, lengthy, contradictory findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, which, as in this case, are designed 
for no purpose other than to attempt to cover up mis-
takes that might have been made in the trial can serve 
no useful purpose but to unduly enlarge, confuse, 
compound, and expand appellate records. Id. at 834. 
Appellants felt that this Court would rely on the court's 
findings rather than those drafted by Respondents. 
Second, the findings are obviously improper under 
the procedural standards for Summary Judgment. On Rule 56 
motions the facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the opposing party, and inferences drawn in his favor. 
Below, the affidavit of Respondent Klein in support of 
his own motion was adopted as findings to support a surmnary 
judgment in his favor, even though the only affidavit 
stipulated to as fact for both motions was one filed by the 
Appellants.~/ The findings are thus suspect at the outset. 
Singleton v. Alexander, supra. 
Third, Appellants were aware that "[f]indings of 
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of 
-9-
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motions under Rule 12 or 56 " Rule 52 U.R.C.P. The 
reason that no findings are needed is simple: 
Since . . . a surrnnary jl1dgment 1'1ay not: be entered 
where there is a genuine issue as to any ~aterial fact, 
there is no fact-finding funct.Lon in connection with 
the entry of su~h a judgment. It follo~s that no 
findings of fact are needed to support a summary 
judgment, and Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, expressly so provides. Dred'e Corp. v. 
Penney, 338 F.2d 456, 463 (9th Cir. 964). 
In fact, in General Teamsters, Chauffers & Helpers U. v. 
Blue Cab Co., 353 F.2d 687, (7th Cir. 1965), the court felt 
that the making of findings of fact was ill-advised and 
implied the existence of factual questions. In light of 
Blue Cab it is interesting to note that the Respondents' 37 
findings comprise 12 full pages, although there was supposedly 
no issue of fact. 
Fourth, Appellants considered the second set of 
findings of no effect because they were filed after the 
notice of appeal from the original order. Even the lower 
court stated, on Respondents' urgings, that after the notice 
of appeal was filed it was divested of jurisdiction. 
Fifth, Appellants felt the second findings, so 
discordant with the court's earlier findings, and the 
irregularity thereof, would best be dealt with in the 
separately perfected appeal, Case No. 15274. 
Sixth, the second set of findings were signed 
under extremely prejudicial and suspect circurnstai1ces. 
Respondents mailed the proposed findings to Appellants and 
to the court on Thursday, April 7, 1977. (R. 385, 391) 
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Appellants received the findings on Monday, April 11, and 
immediately telephoned the court, only to discover they had 
already been signed.I/ The lower court refused to hear 
Appellants' objections to the findings, concluding, on 
Respondents' urgings, that the filing of a notice of appeal 
from the earlier order had divested it of jurisdiction to 
review the second order. (Transcript May 25, 1977 at 3: 17-
22; Minute Entry attached to Clerk's Certificate filed 
June 16, 1977) 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants did not feel 
that these findings and conclusions were entitled to considera-
o tion in this appeal. As Respondents have raised them in 
their brief, and as this Court has, sua sponte, consolidated 
the appeals, Appellants will speak to those findings and 
conclusions in this brief. 
B. The Summary Judgment as Rendered Below Was Improper. 
The summary judgment in favor of Respondents was 
improperly rendered below in that the lower court not only 
found facts, but based its decision on an express finding 
that the prevailing parties' version of the facts was true. 
This case below was heard on cross-motions for 
summary judgment. In such circumstances, each party claims 
his entitlement to judgment, based on his opponent's version 
of the facts; neither, however, concedes his opponent's 
facts for purposes of his opponent's motion. 
Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side 
that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the 
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making of such inherently contradictory claims does not 
constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the 
other is necessarily justified or that the losing party 
waives judicial consideration and de~_- »::mination of 
whetheL· genuine issues of material fact exist-. If any 
such issue exists it must be disposeu of by n plenary 
trial and not on summary judgment. R2~ns v. Cascade 
Industries, Inc., 402 f. 2d 241, 245 {~:--d Cir :--TiJb[} 
It is clear that motions for summary judgment do 
not resolve or admit disputed issues of fact for judgment, 
nor necessarily eliminate the necessity of trial, despite 
the number of parties seeking summary judgment, and despite 
allegations for purposes of each motion that there are no 
disputed issues of fact. 
Cross-motion confusion often arises in cases 
similar to the instant one where an interpretation of docu-
mentary language is critical. While both parties may concede 
what the document says, there may remain a dispute pertaining 
to what it means. If the disputed inferences are material, 
evidence of intent and understanding must be taken precedent 
to making findings of fact and resolving the case. 
This Court has recognized that regardless of the 
number of parties seeking summary judgment, disputes as to 
material inferences may still exist. For example, in 
West v. West, 15 Utah 2d 87, 387 P.2d 686 (1963), a man 
brought suit against his wife and son for dissolution of a 
partnership and for an accounting. The parties placed 
several documents before the court, each contending ·for an 
interpretation thereof inapposite to the other. The plaintiff-
husband unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, the lower 
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court specifically finding that he intended and understood 
that certain monies advanced to the partnership were contri-
butions to capital. On appeal this Court perceived that 
though the physical facts were not disputed, the inferences 
drawn by the lower court were clearly contested: 
[I]f the matter were to be determined solely upon the 
basis of the documents, we would be inclined to the 
view contended for by the plaintiff as to monies 
advanced after the initial investment. But it should 
be abundantly plain that the documents are ambiguous 
and uncertain. It is therefore necessary to take 
evidence and make findings of fact as to what the 
intent of the parties was in executing them. In that 
connection it is proper to consider the background and 
circumstances, including the relationship of the 
parties, the purposes for which the various documents 
were made and principles of equity and justice relating 
thereto. West v. West, 15 Utah 2d 87, 91, 387 P.2d 686 
(1963). 
Defendants then contended that plaintiff was precluded from 
appealing those findings because he had conceded for purposes 
of his motion that there was no dispute as to material 
facts. This Court flatly rejected that proposition, stating: 
When a party thinks that his case is so clear that 
he should have a summary judgment without trial and so 
moves, the denial of that motion settles that issue and 
nothing else. That is, that he is not entitled to the 
summary judgment. Depending on what else he asserts 
and what is plead in opposition thereto, there may well 
be issues of fact in dispute which it is necessary to 
resolve in order to settle the controversy. In such 
event a trial of such disputed facts is necessary, 
re ardless of who or how man arties have moved 
for a rulin in their avor as a matter o aw. Id. 
(emphasis ad e 
The West case makes it clear that even inferential 
fact issues may not be resolved by sunnuary judgment. In the 
instant case, for example, neither party contests what para-
graph 5 of the Option Agreement sa~, only what it @eans, 
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the Appellants stating it called for a future agreement in 
any instance, the Respondents claiming otherwise. The lower 
court, however, found it did not constitute au agreement to 
agree. 
In summary, each party movictg for summary judgment 
merely claims his entitlement to judgment as a matter of 
law, neither party, however, conceding his opponent's facts 
and inferences for purposes of his opponent's motion. Further, 
"findings" are clearly improper at summary judgment because 
they are made without proper judicial c0nsideration of the 
weight of testimony and credibility and demeanor of witnesses. 
See Singleton v. Alexande~. 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 
(1967). That Appellants failed to prevail on their motion 
should settle "that issue and nothing else". Nonetheless, 
Respondents now infer that denial of Appellants' motion 
automatically entitles them to a suIDJnary judgment; i.e., that 
Appellants have stipulated to have inferences drawn against 
them by the lower court: 
. . . counsel for all parties stipulated that the 
matter would be disposed of by motion for summary 
judgment (RB 13) 
The lower court also seemed to feel that as both 
parties moved for summary judgment, a ruling in favor of one 
party or the other, disposing of the case, was mandated. 
Are you prepared to s·1.1bmit it on the motions or are 
there any issues of fact that should be determined, 
that is what I'd like to know, just without a lot of 
horsing around on your Motions for SUP~~ary Judgment? 
(T. at 6:3-6, R: 399). 
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Okay, I don't want you to dodge around because I am 
going to tie you down right now. What I am saying is 
that are you prepared -- do you want to argue this on a 
Motion for Summary Judgment or are you prepared to 
stipulate that this case may be submitted to the Court 
as a question of law based upon your statement of facts 
as set forth in your Motion for Summary Judgment? Id. 
at 6:9-15. 
The Court then called for a stipulation "that it 
is a question of law based upon the facts as set forth in 
your respective motions". Id. at 6:26-28. 
The confusion is apparent. Simply stated, the 
lower court's difficulty in conceptualizing the procedure 
for simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment in a 
case where there were still contested issues of fact resulted 
in his taking each party's view of the facts as true for 
that party's own motion. Having so disposed of all fact 
issues, he then vacated the trial date and approved the 
facts as set forth in Resuondents' affidavit as being true 
and correct for purposes of Respondents' motion. (Order, R. 
359; Affidavit of Robert Klein, R. 337; Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, R. 369.) Appellants are confident 
that this method of disposing of the trial calendar and 
eliminating contested factual stances is not authorized by 
the rules of this Court. 
It should be noted that the affidavit submitted 
and filed by Handa Sandberg on March 15, 1977, the morning 
of the hearing, was stipulated to as "uncontroverted" fact 
for purposes of both motions. (T. at 7:12-15, R. 399; 
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Affidavit at R. 355) Ultimately, it appears that the lower 
court misconstrued the parties' stipulation on Mrs. Sandberg's 
affidavit and instead attached the "llncontrovertecl" label to 
Klein's affidavit filed one month earlier. (R. 337-348; 
Order, R. 359) This is the only plausible explanation the 
Appellants can offer for the court's "findings". 
C. Specific Objections to Findinzs of Fact. 
Appellants attempted to make objections to Respondents' 
self-serving findings in the lower court but the court felt 
an interposed notice of appeal divested it of jurisdiction. 
This Court, nevertheless, may consider "the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence . . . whether or not the party 
raising the question has made in the district court an 
objection to such findings ... " Rule 52(b) U.R.C.P. 
Immaterial Findings 
Several of the findings are immaterial to the 
issues of the case. The parties' acts before the exercise 
of the option have no bearing on whether the option was 
exercised according to its terms. Specifically, the acti-
vities with the Dixie Rural Electric Association condenmation 
(Findings No. 6 & 8) and the annexation of the land to the 
City of St. George (Finding No. 12) have no bearing on the 
sufficiency of the exercise of the option. 
Irrelevant Findin~s 
Several other facts fouud have no probative value, 
such as the establishment of a survey corner (Finding No. 15), 
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and the failure of the Probate Order to mention Klein's 
interest. (Finding No. 7) 
Findings Showing Failur~T_o __ ~?<ercis_~ 
Other facts found have no bearing on a proper 
exercise, and in fact tend to indicate Klein's desperate 
attempts to save himself from loss of a good deal. For 
example, his insistence on performance after the option's 
expiration and Mrs. Sandberg's refusal to perform (Finding 
No. 17), the submission of a real estate contract nearly a 
year after the option's expiration (Finding No. 21), the 
tender of some payments (Findings No. 22 and 23), sending a 
letter demanding conveyance (Finding No. 24), his alleged 
readiness to perform after the option expired (Finding No. 27) 
and Appellant~' refusal to allow a tardy exercise or recognize 
the earlier act as an exercise (Findings No. 25 and 26), 
while designed to show Klein's intent to exercise and good 
faith, merely display his failure to exercise. These acts, 
done largely after Klein's retention of counsel, do nothing 
to revive the option. That these belated attempts to comply 
with the option were of no effect was pointed out in Appellants' 
Brief at 73-77 and 86-95. 
Findings Resolving Disputed Issues Against Appellants 
Of course, all of the findings are subject to the 
same fatal objection; that they are in conformity with 
Respondents' affidavit when Respondents prevailed on summary 
judgment below. Appellants had alleged and presented 
evidence which contradicts several of the findings made. 
-17-
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Patently, the facts were not viewed favorably to Appellants. 
Finding No. 13 cites that Mrs. Sandberg met with and made 
suggestions to Klein's surveyor, while Mn;. Sandberg has no 
recollection of a11y such suggestions. (DWS al 17; 
AnWS No. 12, R. 135-136) Finding No. 15 describes a meeting 
with the county commission, while Mrs. Sandberg denies it 
ever took place. (DWS at 12) Again, Finding No. 16 deals 
with other conversations with Klein or his surveyor which 
Mrs. Sandberg has denied. (AnWS No. 17, R. 137; DWS at 13) 
Finding No. 33, that the conveyance of 40 acres 
was an acknowledgment of exercise as to all the property is 
contradictory to Mrs. Sandberg's statements that she believed 
that 40 acres was the full extent of the exercise. (DWS 
23:24-29; 24:17-20) She then understood the option to have 
expired (Id. at 30:12-13), and denied any discussion per-
taining to the remainder of the acreage. (Id. at 30:16-23, 
and 56:4) 
Finding No. 36 that Mrs. Sandberg acknowledged 
Klein's purchase to third parties in 1972 is totally unfounded 
and again contradicts Mrs. Sandberg's testimony. 
51-53) 
(Id. at 
Findings Contradictory to the Evidence a~d Self-Contradictory 
Several findings are not only contradictory to the 
evidence, but actually self-contradictory~ Most blatant are 
the findings of conformity of land descriptions. For example, 
while the land descriptions reproduced :Ln Findings 2 ancl 5 
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are clearly different, they are treated as identical. 
Further, the survey prepared by Klein's surveyor is found to 
conform to the other two descriptions in Finding No. 20. 
Finally, to allay any doubt, Findings No. 21 and 28 find all 
descriptions conforming. The record below, however, clearly 
depicts the descriptions as contradictory. (See also 
Appellants' Brief, hereinafter AB, 53-63, especially 60-61) 
Respondents now suggest a reformation of the descriptions, 
for the first time on appeal. Alternatively, they ask this 
Court not to concern itself with the facts. (RB at 15) 
Findings No. 21, 22, 28 and 30 specifically state 
that the real estate contract and cashier's check conform as 
to consideration with the option terms. Yet the findings 
themselves recite that only $19,000 was paid under the 
option (Finding No. 10), while the contract recites a $20,000 
payment to be credited to Klein. Appellants' Brief pointed 
out this error at page 94. 
Finding No. 21 specifically declares the exercise 
of the option by the tender of a check, while the Option 
Agreement clearly called for execution of a contract. The 
court's findings found the option exercised by the March 30, 
1971, letter, and the June 3, 1971 check. 
Findings No. 30 and 32 state that the documents 
are clear, unambiguous, and in the case of the OptiQn Agreement, 
not an agreement to agree. While certainly clear standing 
alone, the Earnest Money Agreement and Option Agreement 
describe different parcels, and the latter document is 
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unintegrated. Neither, however, conforms to the proferred 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, and to accept Klein's inter-
pretation of the phrase, "as the parties may agree" is 
heinous. Lastly, it is all too convenient that the unambig-
uous and clear Option Agreement was found to fail to specify 
the party responsible for preparing the real estate contract 
requisite for its exercise. (Finding No. 34) Klein, under 
the law, bore the burden of exercise. (AB at 64) Also, Klein 
had provided that the expense of such preparation could be 
credited against the ultimate purchase price, pursuant to 
paragraph Sh of the option. Appellants cannot understand 
how the lower court found that they, as optionors, had a 
duty of exercising their own option, leaving Respondent 
Klein, the optionee, utterly confused as to his obligations. 
After all, Respondent Klein drafted the option to state that 
he could exercise only by execution of a real estate contract. 
His alleged confusion is both feigned and inexcusable. 
Likewise, the finding that Mrs. Sandberg requested 
a delay in the survey which caused a delay in contract 
preparation is unfounded and illogical. The reason for 
delay is found in Findings No. 16, 29 and 34 and explained 
in Finding No. 28. But what precluded Respondents from 
submitting a real estate contract with the same price 
formula contained in the option? The initial do~m ~ayment 
was set at $2,000 regardless of the amount of land selected 
and agreed to. While Respondents claim through Finding No. 
28 that calculation of price was essential prior to execution 
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of a contract, the first payment relating in any way to the 
amount of land selected was not due until one year after the 
purported exercise. Thus, Klein could have submitted a con-
tract with the price formula, and in the first year completed 
a survey to ascertain the amount of the first annual payment. 
This he failed to do, with neither the selection of agreed 
land, nor the tender of a contract occurring in a timely 
manner. 
The finding (actually a legal conclusion) of 
waiver of timely preparation (Finding No. 34) is dealt with 
infra in Point VI, B, at 42. 
The finding that the Option Agreement was not an 
agreement to agree was dealt with at p. 41 in Appellants' 
Brief. See also Point IV, at 29 infra for the reply to 
Respondents' arguments. 
The finding that Klein exercised as to all the 
land subject to the Option Agreement (Finding No. 33), is 
also contradictory to all the evidence. See Appellants' 
Brief at 61 and Table II in the Appendix. Klein drafted 
this finding to avoid the conclusion that he attempted 
exercise as to only part of the land, which exercise, even 
in his view, would have required the agreement of the 
parties. That such a finding was entered, however, does not 
alter the descriptions in the record. The lack of support 
for Respondents' self-serving findings is evident. It is 
little wonder that Klein desires that this Court overlook 
them. (RB at 15) 
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Illegitimate Findings 
Appellants further contend that several findings 
extend far beyond the court's earlier Order and Respondents' 
theory of the case propounded below. While the court 
earlier found the option had been timely and properly 
exercised, Respondents' fervor to protect their record, 
estop Appellants from asserting defenses and shelter the 
flimsy framework of "proper exercise" has caused that frame-
work to be obfuscated by Respondents' protective boiler-
plate of waiver, estoppel, and part performance. 
To make. findings after a summary judgment is 
• suspect, to freely delegate the making of findings to counsel 
is patently improper, and to allow such findings as these to 
stand is a mockery. 
D. S¥ecific Assignments of Error to the Conclusions 
o Law. 
Appellants' original brief pointed out the erroneous 
application of the law on the legal issues decided by the 
lower court in its order entered Harch 25, 1977. Specifi-
cally, Appellants argued that: 
1. The court failed to apply the high eviden-
tiary standard ("clear and convincing") appropriate to 
actions for specific performance. (AB 24) 
2. The court erroneously considered evidence 
other than that signed by Mrs. Sandberg. (AB 27) 
3. The court erroneously concluded the Option 
Agreement was not an agreement to agree. (AB 41) 
4. The court ignored the fact that the Option 
Agreement was incomplete by lack of a contemplated 
exhibit. (AB 51) 
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5. The court erroneously concluded that the 
various land descriptions were sufficient, unambiguous, 
and conforming. (AB 53) 
6. 
exercise 
The court ignored proper law in finding an 
of the option. (AB 64) 
7. The court improperly decreed specific perform-
ance of a document which contained terms inconsistent 
with the option. (AB 86) 
As Appellants' initial brief did not deal with 
the second order, Table I in the Appendix correlates Appel-
lants initial legal arguments with the issues raised in the 
second set of findings and conclusions. 
POINT Ill 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS A DEFENSE 
Respondent argues that the Statute of Frauds 
cannot be asserted to preclude enforcement of the "writings" 
in the record in that 
[t]his is not a case in which Respondent is seeking to 
enforce an oral agreement to convey land. The agree-
ments in this case have all been written. (RB at 17) 
Respondent assumes, however, that all of his profferred 
writings~/ automatically satisfy the statute once they 
appear on paper. Nonetheless, as Appellants have contended: 
The statute requires that the contract designate the 
parties, identify the land to be conveyed, recite the 
consideration therefor, and contain the signature of at 
least the party to be charged. (AB at 17) 
See 72 Am.Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds §295 (1973). Thus, 
writings other than the Option Agreement and Earnest Money 
Receipt cannot be properly asserted against Mrs. Sandberg. 
Further, only these documents were pled by Respondents in 
their counterclaim. Due to their insufficient and discordant 
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descriptions, nonexistent exhibits, and requirements of 
future agreement, however, these documents are insufficient 
to bind Mrs. Sa~dberg. 
Respondents also claim that Appellants have not 
formally raised the issue of the Statute of Frauds below.~/ 
Below, there was no apparent need. Because Respondents 
pled only the Option Agreement and Earnest Money Receipt 
against Appellants, and both of those documents hear the 
signature of Mrs. Sandberg, Appellants could not properly 
object to those documents on the basis of the statute. When 
it became apparent at the hearing, however, that Respondents 
desired to bind Mrs. Sandberg on the basis of unsigned 
letters and parol conversations, it became proper for Appel-
lants to assert the statute as an evidentiary objection to 
all of the evidence, parol in nature, or signed only by 
Klein, contradictory to the writings. Thus, by the very 
course of proof offered by Respondents, at variance with their 
pleadings, Appellants' assertions of the statute to preclude 
judicial consideration of those parol matters must, under 
Rule 15 U.R.C.P. and for reasons of substantial justice, be 
treated as if raised in the pleadines. 
Thus, Respondents' objection to Appellants raising 
the statute forgets that Respondents, not Appellants, first 
strayed from the pleadings, seekin~ specific performance of 
written documents on the basis of unsigned letters and 
dangling conversations. This tactical ploy not only surprised 
Appellants but is contrary to the HelJ -settled prindp1C' 
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that parties seeking specific performance must conform their 
evidence to the pleadings. 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance 
§189 (1977). Similarly, Appellants being moved against for 
summary judgment were entitled to know their opponents' 
evidence. Burningham v, Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974). 
Lastly, Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. generally permits a judicial 
excursion beyond the pleadings to avoid injustice or fundamental 
error. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 Utah 
2d 329, 353 P.2d 168 (1960). Such injustice or error would 
certainly result here if this Court were to disregard such 
an essential rule_ of law. See, ~. Greenblatt v. Munro, 
, 161 C.A.2d 596, 326 P.2d 929 (1958). 
Respondents' third argument that the Statute of 
Frauds does not apply is based upon a misapplication of the 
doctrine of part performance. Appellants do not agree that 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 
480 (1956) states the applicable law in the instant case. 
First, Randall does not deal with an intervivos parol agree-
ment to convey (as this present case does, there being no 
sufficient memorandum), but with a decedent's earlier parol 
promise to devise. Part performance under each is vastly 
different. As stated in Note, "The Doctrine of Part Performance 
as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah", 9 Utah L.Rev. 
91, 101, 102 (1964): 
[The promise to devise] differs from the one 
involved in a contract for the intervivos transfer of 
land in two respects: First, the plaintiff cannot 
perform the acts of going into possession and making 
valuable improvements because no possessory rights 
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accrue to the plaintiff until the defendant's death; 
and sc~cond, thf' promise to de vise results in the forma-
tion of a unilateral contract. 
Un1ike the intervivos sale situation where payment 
of consideration bv the plaintiff i~ not_!':!:..8_arded as an 
act of part i:;erformance, in persona-r--service situations 
the only act performed by the: plaintiff is the very 
consideration called for by the agreement. 
Further, Randall was decided when the doctrine of 
part performance was in flux in Utah and often mixed with 
elements of estoppel. Appellants submit that the doctrine 
of part performance is more accurately stated in the more 
recent case of Holmgren Brothers, Inc., v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 
611 (Utah 1975). 
According to Holmgren, the threshold question is 
whether there is a contract and what its terms are. 
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, defi-
nite, mutually understood, and estciblished by clear, 
unequivocal and definite testimony, or other evidence 
of the same quality. Id. at 614 citing Christensen v. 
Christensen, 9 Utah 2-cr--102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959). 
The reason for this strict requirement of an 
unequivocal showing that there was an actual agreement 
complete in all its terms was explained in an early case. 
To call anything a part performance, before the ex-
isten~e of the thing (the contract) whereof it is said 
to be part performance is established, is an antici-
pation of proof by assumption, ancl gets rid of the; 
statute by jumping over it, for the statute requires 
proof, and prescribes the medium of proof. Adams v. 
Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465, 466, (1915), citing 
Roberts on Fraucs, 135. 
See_ also 73 Am. Jur. :'d Statute of Fra\1ds §lf01 (1974). 
In the instant case, the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract, upon which Klein seeks specific performance, was 
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drafted one year after the option expired, and contains a 
land description which did not exist on paper when the 
option was purportedly exercised. TI1e contract differs 
materially from the option in consideration, time require-
ments, and necessity of mutual futute agreement as to land 
sold. Unsigned by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought, it does not provide the threshold proof of existence 
and terms of a contract requisite under Holmgren to invoke 
the part performance doctrine. 
Assuming, arguendo, however, that the threshold 
proof of a contract has been made, Holmgren further delin-
eates those acts sufficient to constitute a part performance. 
These are transfer of consideration in conjunction with 
either the making of valuable improvements on the land, or 
entry into possession with the consent of the vendor. Addi-
tionally, these acts must be performed subsequent to the 
existence of the contract, and be exclusively referable to 
it. 
In addition [to clear, unequivocal and definite proof 
of the contract and its mutually understood terms] 
there must be acts of part performance which in equity 
are considered sufficient to take the case out of the 
statute of frauds: (1) Any improvements must be sub-
stantial, valuable, or beneficial. (2) A valuable 
consideration is demanded by equity. (3) If there is 
possession, such possession must be actual, open, 
definite, not concurrent with the vendor, but it must 
be with the consent of the vendor. (4) Such acts as 
are relied on must be exclusively referable to the 
contract [footnotes omitted]. Holmgren Brothers, Inc., 
v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 614. ·(Utah 1975). 
While Respondent claims the facts in this case 
"clearly establish part performance hy Mrs. Sandberg and 
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Respondent", and that "fpjart1al perfcnnonce by hoth parties 
bars a staLuLe )f trauds ~efense • 11 (lrn at 19), tl1c 
acts to be consicl'"1:ed in evc.Juatinl'. a clc;im of part perform-
ance . .ir-c ac•:s performed by thtc &r~0-~· As stated by an 
early Massachusetts Supreme Cour1 decision responding to 
alleg.:i.Lions that <• gr au tor s cc,nvc. y:i.nce oJ part_)g/ of the 
land invoked the doctrine of part performance as to the 
remainder: 
Indeed, the ruLe seems to be that no part per-
formance, by the party sought to be charged, will take 
an a~~eement out of the statute uf frauds, except in 
those cases where the statute itself provides for such 
effect. It is part performance by the party seeking to 
enfo;ce, and not by the other party, to which courts of 
equity look, in giving relief from the statute. 
Glass v. HurJbe ·c, 102 Nass. 24, 31 (1869) (citations 
omitted). 
Klein does claim some cf his actions unequivocally 
evince hie part performance: 
On June 7, 1971, Respondenr tendered a down payment to 
Mrs. Sandberg which was accepted and cashed . 
Respondent made substantial payments over the years 
which we~e a~cepted; Respondent expended time, energy, 
and money in having a survey monument establjshecl and 
in having the property annexed to the City of St. 
George; Respondent had the property surveyed; and 
Respon<!ent had the Real Estate Sales Contract prepared. 
(RB at 19) 
Acts of payment alone are never sufficient to 
constitute part pc;·forrnance [n qdaition, th~ pay.rents were 
admittedly made simply to extend the option. The act of 
annexation was do,1e afte< the lei.cer Resp011dcmt claims 
exercisc'd Uk optton, t;ut, ily tlh letLer'1, O'·Tn terms, prior 
to exer~:is_.§_, i.e .. prior to any cont,·act. The surveyi11g W<;s 
done after the expiration of the option, but surveying, 
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similar to annexation, is not a substantial improvement on 
the land. Furthermore, were surveying or annexation a 
sufficient act of part performance <'xclusively referable to 
a parol contract, it would allow a unilateral act to define 
the scope of that contract. Similarly, if Klein's prepara-
tion of a contract of purchase can constitute sufficient 
part performance of a parol agreement, Klein as the draftsman 
could easily and unilaterally select its parameters. 
The Statute of Frauds is a viable defense in this 
case and should bar all evidence of an agreement, other than 
that in writing and signed by Mrs. Sandberg. Respondents' 
unsigned letters, tender of monies and unilaterally drafted 
purchase contract, while perhaps material and admissible 
to show the attempted exercise of the option, cannot be 
legitimately used to clarify or establish the terms of the 
option or the agreement of the parties, and avoid the 
Statute of Frauds through the part performance doctrine. 
POINT IV 
THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS AN 
UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT TO AGREE 
Appellants and Respondents disagree as to whether 
the Option Agreement is unenforceable as an agreement to 
agree. The dispute arises under two different types of 
clauses, one apparently requiring future agreement as to 
selection of land in any event, the other providing for 
future agreement on material terms as alternatives to fixed 
terms. (AB 41-51) 
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Appellants maintain that the Option Agreement 
r8quired a future agreement of the parties as to the land 
subject to eventual purchase. This contention is based on 
Appellants' interpretation of Paragraph 5 of the Option 
Agreement drafted by Respondent hlein. 
5. The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase 
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dollars 
($200. 00) per acre at any tL1!e during the option 
period, (including any extension period) ~executing 
a contract to purchase all or such part or parts of 
the &roperty as the ~arties rnay agree; such contract to 
pure ase shall provi e as follows . . . (R. 61) (emphasis 
added) 
Appellants interpret the paragraph as requiring the agree-
ment of the parties as to land purch1sed in all events. 
(See Point V, AB at 41-45) Conversely, Respondents assert 
that this provision requires an agreement of the parties 
only if there is an attempted exercise as to part of the 
land subject to the option. (RB 22) Appellants feel that 
careful analysis of the paragraph belies Respondents' claims, 
but even if Respondents' interpretation is accepted, the 
facts show an attempted exercise as to only part of the 
property described in the Option Agreement. (AB at 61) Thus, 
even under Respondents' strained interpretation, the require-
ment of future agreement is factually invoked. 
Wanda Sandberg disputes Respondents' claims that 
the $19,000 in payments made to extend the option make her 
construction of paragraph 5 unreasonable. Under amicable 
circumstances, parties often provide for future agreement, 
as is evinced by the plethora of decisions focusing on this 
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point. Many such contracts doubtless avoid judicial considera-
tion because the contemplated agreement is reached. Ignorant 
of the legal consequences of such a clause, the parties here 
made and received payments; Mrs. Sandberg holding the land 
from the open market and anticipating the making of such 
future agreement as a condition precedent to Klein's exer-
cise. This is reasonable. And, as Klein admittedly 
drafted the option, perhaps "Appellants' construction" is 
not the issue. In such cases this Court should be con-
cerned with Appellants' "understanding" of the paragraph. 
Jensen v. Anderson, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366 (1970). 
0 Clearly, this was her understanding. (DWS at pp. 13, 30; R. 
398) The fact that Klein paid $19,000 changes neither the 
substance of the option or the equities. Thinking Respond-
ents had exercised the option by selecting a 40-acre parcel, 
Appellants deeded them the same,. concededly worth $28,000, 
in 1971. (DRK 11:20-24, DWS at 26) 
The parties clearly recognized the necessity of 
such an agreement as the expiration of the option approached. 
(See AB 47-49) Also, Respondents conceded as late as eleven 
months after the option expired, not only the necessity of 
such future agreement, but that such agreement had not yet 
been reached. In May, 1972, Respondents' attorney wrote: 
The parties have also tentatively agreed as to the 
property description which, in our opinion, is"the only 
matter yet to be fully resolved. (R. 115) 
Appellants also maintain that the presence of 
other clauses in the Option Agreement which allow alterna-
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" 
tive performances of material terms render the option void 
under the authority of Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385 
(Cal.Dist.Ct.App 1947). Responuents sufTll'larize Appellants' 
argument and Respondents' objection quite well. 
. . . Appellants cite Kline . . for the proposition 
that providing for a future agreement only as an alter-
native renders a contract void. The holding of that 
case does not even approximate such a proposision. (RB 
at 21) 
Respondents' following analysis of the case, however, sacrifices 
accuracy for brevity. 
The court in Kline v. Rogerson stated the following as 
the sole issue for determination: 'Was plaintiff the 
owner or holder of the check executed by defendant?' 
Contrarx to Appellants' representation that the general 
phrase 'or terms to mutual satisfaction" following very 
specific terms rendered the contract void, the specific 
terms of the contract were unenforceable simply because 
defend::mt had not signed the contract which meant he 
had not at:i:eed to the specific terms. (RB at 21) 
Respondents apparently refer to the fact that in Kline the 
parties had previously executed a deposit receipt (reproduced 
in the margin of the case) but failed to execute a contract 
of sale. However, as is apparent from a close reading, the 
deposit receipt was essentially an agreement of sale. On 
the basis of that receipt, Kline claimed the deposit as a 
forfeiture. The court found that the deposit receipt was not 
effective as an agreement for sale solely by reason of the 
alternative phrase "or terms to mutual satisfaction": 
The deposit receipt sianed by defendant did not 
constitute an agreement of pui:chase and sale by the 
parties since it expressly provided that the bala~ 
of the urchase rice was to be aio"'at $~0-0r 
more per year, p us interest at Yo o£Terms to-IilUfual 
satisfaction''. Since the parties never agreed upon 
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terms which were mutually satisfactory, there was never 
an agreement of purchase and sale. Hence the plaintiff 
was not entitled to any portion of the purchase price. 
181 P.2d at 387 (emphasis added). 
That this was the decision of the case, that is, that future 
agreement as an alternative to specified terms renders a 
contract unenforceable as an agreement to agree, is brought 
out in the following cases, all of which cite Kline as 
Appellants have done. Roberts v. Adams, 330 P.2d 900, 903 
(Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1958), Burgess v. Rodom, 121 Cal.App.2d 71, 
262 P.2d 335, 336 (1953), Alaimo v. Tsunoda, 215 Cal.App.2d 
94, 29 Cal.Rptr 806, 808 (1953). See also Annot., 68 ALR 2d 
1221, 1229 (1959). 
Appellants maintain that under the authority of 
Kline, clauses providing for future agreement even as an 
alternative render a contract uncertain and unenforceable. 
Paragraphs Sb and e of the Option Agreement fall expressly 
within this category. 
POINT V 
THE LAND DESCRIPTIONS ARE FATALLY DEFICIENT 
Respondents allege that the Court should overlook 
the fact that the land descriptions in the various documents 
are contradictory. Furthermore, although the exhibits 
allegedly appended to the letter of exercise neither are in the 
record nor were they presented by Respondents below and are 
thus concededly a matter of conjecture, Respondents ask this 
Court to accept their description proferred one year after 
the option expired. (RB 37; R. 117; R. 166, 170) Appellants 
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submit that it would be unjust to enforce this unilateral 
declaration of self interest; rather, only clearly proven 
contracts and agreements should be specifically enforced. 
Pitcher v. Lauritze~, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). 
Respondents also allege that the land description 
is a non-issue due to Wanda Sandberg's use of Respondents' 
metes and bounds description in her complaint to quiet 
title. Appellants used that description in the cor.1plaint 
because that description is what Respondents used in their 
contract which was the cloud on title sought to be removed. 
Respondents also prepared "findings" that Mrs. 
Sandberg waived her objection to the land description defects. 
The fallacy in this argument is that a waiver of defects 
does nothing to cure the deficiency, and render a descrip-
tion certain. Respondents apparently contend, however, that 
a "waiver" enables them to select whatever land they desire 
and claim it for the description. Nonetheless, no two 
descriptions before this Court conform, though several on 
th . b" 11/ eir own are unam iguous.- See AB at 59-61, and Table II, 
Comparison of Land Descriptions, in the Appendix. 
Respondents now advance plausible explanations for 
the contradictions between the documents, but in doing so 
commit several fatal errors. 
First, they locate a reservoir on the maps when 
there is absolutely no evidence in the record depicting the 
same, other than the Earnest Money Rece:i pc. which says it is 
somewhere in the NE l/Lf NE 1/4 of Section 22. Second, they 
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assume that the fence Klein pointed out to his surveyor and 
allegedly plotted in the Real Estate Purchase Contract is 
the fence indicated in the other agreements. There is no 
evidence that an unaided surveyor, using the Option Agree-
ment or Earnest Money Receipt descriptions would find the 
fence to be the one referred to in these documents. Thus, 
Klein's assertion is a self-indulgent one; there are several 
fences on the property. Third, Respondents rely on a con-
versation in 1971 that the fence platted by Klein's surveyor 
in 1972 was earlier agreed upon. Mrs. Sandberg recalls 
walking a fenceline, and that the land selected would be 
''located within the property physically identified by the 
parties"; nothing else. See AnWS No. 9, R. 134. Thus, such 
parol testimony now unilaterally supplies the description, 
otherwise indeterminate. This is impermissible under the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The land must be described in the agreement or by 
reference to a plan or other matter so that it can be 
identified and located, and the description must be 
sufficiently definite within itself and not require the 
aid of parol testimony or be left to the future action 
of the same or other parties. Safe Delosit & Trust Co. 
v. Diamond Coal and Coke Co., 234 Pa. 00, 83 A. 54, 
5 7 , LRA 191 7 A 5 9 6 . ( l 912 ) . 
Apart from Wanda Sandberg's denial of such an agreement, con-
siderations of Klein's credibility, and the actuality of his 
pointing out the same fence to a surveyor, the fact remains 
that this testimony is parol. 
\\Thile Respondents cite Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 
92, 164 P.2d 893 (1946) for the proposition that extrinsic 
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and documentary evidence of description may be properly con-
sidered, they fail to specify the logical limitations of 
such a rule. Clearly, such evidence must he used ?n):Y _ _l_<?_?_id __ A~~ 
clarify a ]and description, not to explain differences between 
two different descriptions or to supply a new description. 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to 
supply, a description of lands in a contract. Parol 
evidence will not be admitted to complete a defective 
description, or to show the intention with which it was 
made. Parol evidence may be used for the purpose of 
identifying the description contained in the writing 
with its location upon the ground, but not for the 
purpose of ascertaining and locating ~~e land about 
which the parties negotiated, and supplying a descrip-
tion thereof which they have omitted from the writing. 
There is a c_lear distinction between the ad1:1ission of 
oral and extrinsic evidence for the purpose of identi-
fying the land described and applying the description 
to the property and that of supplying and adding to a 
description insufficient and void on its face. Davison 
v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 342, 517 P.2d 1026, (1973), 
Appell;mts submit that what Klein actually seeks 
is a parol reformation of the Option Agreement. He admits 
the descriptions vary in the Earnest Money Receipt and the 
Option Agreement. (RB at 33) He further admits that the 
option's description does not conform with his proferred 
Real Estate Purchase Contract. Klein's suggestion, therefore, 
that this Court ignore this variance as a scrivener's error 
seeks, through parol, not to clarify, but to change the 
description in his Option Agreement, and somehow make it 
conform to the Earnest Money Receipt and proferred contract. 
Klein presents his view of the reservoir and fence locations, 
and his recollection of an alleged oral ar,reement to support 
this reformation of the plain and clear language of the 
Option Agreement. His desperate resort to parol attempts to 
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avoid the obvious conclusion that his exercise was only as 
to part of the land described in the Option Agreement. 
Ultimately, Klein's attempted reformation, not 
clarification, of the Option Agreement by resort to uni-
laterally proferred and self-serving parol makes the whole 
contract parol and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 
[W]here a written agreement is varied by oral testi-
mony, the whole contract in legal contemplation becomes 
parol. If there is anything settled in our law that 
principle is finnly established. When, therefore, a 
party to an executory agreement in writing for the sale 
of lands succeeds in refonning it by oral testimony, he 
reduces the whole agreement to a parol contract, and 
derives himself of the right to have it specifically 
perfonned. He pulls down the house on his own head. 
When he coverts the writing into an oral agreement, the 
statute declares it to 'be void'. He has rectified the 
written contract, and in its place has established an 
agreement which in contemplation of law is parol, and 
therefore, by statutory mandate, absolutely invalid and 
without force. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Diamond 
Coal & Coke Co., 234 Pa. 100, 83 A. 54, 58, L.R.A. 
l9l7A 596 (1912). 
This result is generally reached by the courts. To do 
otherwise would be to bootstrap an avoidance of the Statute 
of Frauds by first reforming a contract with parol, and then 
enforcing it as reformed. This is exactly what Klein desires 
to do here; have this Court modify an otherwise sufficient 
description, and then enforce it as modified. 
POINT VI 
THE OPTION WAS NEVER PROPERLY EXERCISED 
The law with respect to the exercise or acceptance 
of an option is succinctly stated in 91 C.J.S. Vendor and 
Purchaser §10 (1955) as follows: 
The acceptance of an option, to be effectual, must 
be unqualified, absolute, uncortclition11l, unequivocal, 
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unambiguous, positive, without reservation, and according 
to the terms or conditions of the option. Substantial 
comlf liance with the terms of the. option is ~ i1o_t __ _ 
iuf icient to constitute an acceptance; to be effectual, 
the acceptance must be identical wjth the offer, or, 
at least, there must be no substantial variation lietween 
them. An acceptance of an option must such a compliance 
with the conditions as to bind both parties, and if it 
fails to do so it binds neither. _!i..:_ (emphasis added) 
This rule of unqualified and absolute acceptance 
has been long adhered to by the Utah courts. See_,~· 
Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah 1974); and Lincoln 
Land and Development Co. v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 324, 489 
P.2d 426 (1971). 
The lower court, however, applied the standard of 
substantial compliance applicable to real estate contracts, 
upon Respondents' explicit recorrunendation. See, Respondents' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities at R. 279, citing 81 
C.J.S. Specific Performance §102 (1953) and Fischer v. Johnson, 
525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974). That real estate contracts are 
used as mortgage substitutes and have no critical event such 
as exercise makes the real estate contract standard inapplic-
able. For a comparison of the option and contract standards, 
see 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance, §§56 and 114 (1977), 
appearing as §§47 and 102 in the 1953 edition. 
Further, Respondents' reference below to Fischer 
for the principle that substantial compliance is sufficient 
to exercise an option is, at best, a curious one. In that 
case, Johnson cited Lincoln Land -'rnd Developrnent Co. v._ 
Thompson, supra, an option case, as a s~:andard for specific 
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performance. (Appellant's Brief, Fischer v. Johnson, No. 13530 
at 13-14.) Fischer's counsel, Mr. Cowley, responded: 
Johnsons' reliance on the case of Lincoln Land and 
Develo~ment Co. v. Thomp~on, 26 UtaFlZ"d 324, 489 P.2d 
426 (1 71), is grounded in this mischaracterization of 
our Earnest Money Agreement for Lincoln involved a 
question of timely and adequate erercise (sic) of an 
option. 
The distinction between an option contract and a 
contract of sale is fundamental. An 'option' is a 
unilateral agreement, a continuing offer to sell, 
binding only upon the optionor-owner to sell within the 
time stated and upon the conditions set forth. The 
option does not become a contract inter hares, in the 
sense of an agreement to convey and pure ase, until 
exercised by the optionee. A 'contract of sale' is a 
mutually binding bilateral agreement which creates an 
obligation to convey by one party and an obligation to 
purchase on the other. (Respondent's Brief, Fischer v. 
Johnson, No. '13530 at 35) 
Respondents' counsel obviously comprehends the 
distinction between executory contracts to purchase real 
estate and option agreements. Nonetheless, he successfully 
asserted the Fischer standard of substantial compliance 
before the lower court. Similarly, cases such as Lamont 
v. Evjen, 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532 (1973), and Leone 
v. Zuniga, 84 Utah Lfl 7, 34 P. 2d 699 (1934), are inapposite 
to option law. 
A. The Consideration Tendered was Insufficient. 
As previously set forth, option agreements call 
for strict compliance in their exercise. Respondents have 
conceded that their tender was $1,000 less than that called 
for by the Option Agreement.11./ (RB 47) As it is both the 
duty and prerogative of the Supreme Court in this equitable 
action to review both the facts and the law, substituting 
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its judgment for that of the lower court, Appellants request 
a reversal of the judgment entered below. Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 19711) AlternRtiveJy, Appellants 
request that this Court remand this case to the lower court 
for a specific finding on the consideration issue as well as 
other matters. 
Respondents' contention that their insufficient 
tender was but a "de minimis" "mathematical error" obviously 
does not comport with the strict compliance standard. (RB 
47) Their excuse that insufficient tender was on1y ''dis-
covered late during the course of litigation" is immaterial, 
a as Appellants cannot be penalized for "late discovery", only 
non-discovery. (Id.) Respondents' new allegations, however, 
th~t the assignments of error pertaining to consideration 
are not properly before this Court are without foundation 
and have seemingly been raised to somehow both shift Respond-
ents' burden of proof and preclude this Court's careful 
scrutiny of the records and submissions before it. 
Though Respondents clearly bore the burden of 
going forward, Appellants' discovery methodically set forth 
the insufficiency of consideration, 131 thus confirming one 
of Appellants' Complaint's initial assertions, that is, 
[t)hat the option agreement between the parties be 
declared to have expired for failure of the Defendant 
[Respondent] to perfo~m and failu!e of consideration. 
(R. 3) (emphasis added) 
Furthermore, a cursory examination of Respondents' affidavit 
in support of sull1.~ary judgment reveals the following assertions: 
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(1) that only $19,000 was tendered on the option as prior 
payments (tl2, R. 399); and (2) that the monies tendered in 
the Real Estate Purchase Contract attached as Exhibit "O" 
thereto reduced by a mysterious $20,000 in prior payments 
conformed to the Option Agreement. (Id.) 
Finally, Appellants' memorandum for summary judg-
ment asserted the following: 
There is no proof either in Mr. Klein's deposition or 
in his responses to Interrogatories and Requests for 
Admissions upon which the Court could find Mr. Klein's 
subsequent tender of monies and deeds to be an unequi-
vocal and unconditional exercise of the option upon its 
terms and conditions as drafted by Mr. Klein's attorney. 
(R. 222-223) 
Respondents' counsel had certainly discovered his 
1 . I • ff. . d l 4 / T . d . b . c ient s insu icient ten er.~ o avoi tne o vious 
implications of this shortcoming, however, Respondents 
successfully recommended the "substantial performance" 
standard and further argued t.hat Appellants were seeking a 
forfeiture, a doctrine totally inapplicable to option law. 
(R. 284-288; see also Point VIII, infra, at 48) 
The lower court's findings specifically set forth 
the conformity of tender requisite for specific performance. 
(Order t4, R. 358) For Respondents now to suggest that this 
Court, sitting in an equitable appeal, is precluded from 
reviewing those findings is oblivious to the record and the 
nature of these proceedings. 
This Court has previously held that issues of fact 
preclude summary judgments where "uncontroverted" affidavits 
nonetheless stood in opposition to the ~_v.erments of Plaintiff's 
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unverified complaint. Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 
14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, 2 A.L.R. 3d 1144 (1963). 
Similarly this Court has held that the movant's affidavit 
itself may be self-contradictory or consist primarily of 
unsubstantiated opinions, precluding summary judgment. 
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). In the instant case, Respondent's 
affidavit (1) stands in opposition to Plaintiffs' complaint, 
and (2) is itself self-contradictory on the issue of con-
sideration. 
Appellants in the instant case have methodically 
set forth the insufficiency of Klein's tender among the 
various documents in the record. 15 / Moreover, the pleadings 
and even the self-serving, conclusory yet contradictory 
nature of Klein's supportive affidavit focus specifically on 
Respondents' inadequate tender. 
B. There Was No Waiver of Compliance. 
The Option Agreement, in clear language, required 
for its exercise the execution of a real estate purchase 
contract by Buyer (Respondents). 161 
The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase this 
property . . . by executing a contract to purchase 
... (~5, R. 61) 
Respondents acknowledge that no contract was presented until 
1972, almost a year after the option expired. Respondents' 
position is that 
. Mrs. Sandberg requested that the survey, which 
was necessary for the preparation of the purchase 
contract in question, be delayed as an accomodation to 
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her. The delay requested by Mrs. Sandberg cannot now 
be used to Appellants' advantage. (RB 38) 
The lower court's original order in this case, 
however, mentioned no such delay, waiver, or estoppel, but 
simply founcl that the option was ci.mely exercised. (Order, 
~~ 3, 7; R. 358) Recognizing the fallacy of the lower court's 
findings as to the manner of exercise, Respondents simply 
supplemented the court's findings with theories of waiver 
and estopp•?.l. These "facts" and legal conclusions are 
surmnarizec L-.i. the second Conclusion of Law. 
Sh,ce Wanda Sandberg did not object to any of the 
conduct by Robert D. Klein prior to the exercise of the 
option on June 7, 1971, and since Wanda Sandberg 
requested the delay in completing the survey (which 
d2l2yed the completion of the contract), and since 
Wanda Sandberg has never objected to the legal descrip-
tion prepared by Howard Stevens and used by Robert D. 
Klein in the Real Estate Purchase Contract, and since 
plaintiffs have never objected to any of the terms and 
condition3 set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Con-
tract prepared, executed and submitted by Robert D. 
Klein to Wanda Sandberg in May of 1972 the plaintiffs 
waived any objections or objections with reference to 
those matters and have, since the tender by Klein in 
June of 1972, been estopped from making any objection 
with reference to said matters. 
Aside from the arguments that (1) the judge had no 
such conclusions in his findings and conclusions, (2) the 
facts do not show a waiver (especially when the facts are 
considered in favor of Appellants, considering Mrs. Sandberg's 
affidavit that she never made such a waiver), and (3) the 
equities are not sufficient to support a waiver or estoppel, 
the resort to waiver as a. panacea remains fallacious. 
First, a waiver by one vendor (or optionor) does 
not constitute a waiver by the other vendors (or optionors). 
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Mansfield v. Re~ding, 269 Pa. 357, 112 A. 437, 438 (1921). 
Therefore, the acts oi Mrs. Sandberg can h!ive no effect on 
the rights of t~e other appellants, ~he children ~ith 
incer~sts in the property. 
Second, as an extension of the time to exercise 
the option varies itf terms, .it must be in writing under. the 
Statute of Frauds and the equal di_gnities rule, and further, 
be supported by consideration. See Gulf Oil Coro. v. Willcoxon, 
211 Ga. 462, 86 S.E. 2d 507, 509 (1955). 
Third, a waiver may only be made of a condition or 
promise that is not a material part of tt<e bargain. This is 
~ expressed in the Restatement of Contracts §297 as follows: 
A promiser whose duty is dependent upon perform-
ance by the other party of a condition or return 
promise that is not a material part of the agreed 
exchange can make that -duty independent of such per-
formance, in advance of the time fixed for it, by a. 
manifestation of willingness that the duty shall be 
thus independent. (emphasis added) 
Here the condition "waived" was the essence of the contract ·· 
the form of acceptance and timeliness~ 
C. There Was No Obstruction of Performance. 
Klein also alleges he should be excused from 
strict compliance with the Option Agreement because Nrs. 
Sandberg prevented his performance. Appellants have no 
argument ¥.'ith Respondents' st&tewent of the doctrine but 
deny that it ap~lie.s here where allegedly Mrs. Sandberg 
merely dee:line<l to pay half of the costs of a survey of "the 
property" in 1971. Klein could have submitted a real estate 
contract with the sJme price formula as the Option Agreernent. 
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As previously pointed out, the acreage and total price did 
not affect the initial payment, but only the first annual 
payment. Klein could also have completed the survey and 
credited the cost against the purchase price under paragraph 
Sh of the Option Agreement, or simply completed the survey 
at his own expense. He drafted the Option Agreement; it 
imposed no such duty of contribution on Appellants; the 
proposal that she pay half is an attempted parol modification. 
Further, there is no evidence that Mrs. Sandberg denied 
Klein's surveyor entry on the land at any time. 
D. The "Exercising Documents" Were a Rejection, 
If Anything. 
Besides assuming that the survey was essential to 
drafting of the contract, Respondents' waiver and obstruction 
arguments presuppose that Mrs. Sandberg had a duty to pay 
one-half the expense of a survey. This was not required by 
the Option Agreement. If the duty arose from Klein's 
acceptance the acceptance was not unconditional. As stated 
by author.ity cited by Respondents at 55 Am.Jur. Vendor and 
Purchaser §39, now appearing as 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and 
Purchaser, §91 (l975): 
If the optionee attaches conditions not warranted by 
the terms of the option to his acceptance or notice of 
his election to buy, this itself amounts to a rejection; 
but it is otherw-ise when the acceptance is in the first 
instance unconditional ... (RB 42). 
Alternatively, if Mrs. Sandberg's participation in 
the survey was ££!. called for by the option or the accept-
ance, how can her refusal to participate effectively waive 
-45-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Klein's timely performance? Simply staten, the alleged 
acceptance in 1971 was either conditional, requiring a<ldi-
tional perfornance on Appel 1 an ts' !'art and thus a :r c:i ec t: ioll, 
or, if unconditional, then Mrs. Sandberg's refusal to partic-
ipate in such survey costs cannot te al1cged as a material 
breach excusing, or waiving Klein;s timely performance. 
POIN'l VII. 
THERE IS NO MUTUALITY 
The lower court held that Klein's unsigned letter 
dated March 30, 1971, and a tender of $2,000 in June of the 
same year exercised the option. This contradicts the option's 
o clear requirement of submission of a formal contract for exer·-
cise. Appellants further complained that there was no 
mutuality within the option period. 
If the letter and the check represent the acceptance of 
the Option Agreement, giving rise to a contract between 
the parties, then as of the date of Klein's 'acceptance' 
both Klein and Mrs. Sandberg must have had enforceabl.e 
obligations. (AB 84) 
Appellants pointed out the problems which Mrs. Sandberg 
would have had in bringing a suit agains~ Klein alleging the 
unsigned letter and check as an acceptance, and cited 
Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P. 1101, llOJ (1926) 
for the proposition that "[a] contract to be bindinr, upon 
one must be binding upon the other." (AB 83) 
Respondents misconstrue Appellants' arg1..auant 
regarding lack of mutuality as implying a need for equivalence. 
This is not the case. Appellants have little doubt that an 
appropriate contract tendered by Respondents would by 
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necessity have contained those forfeiture provisions called 
for in the Option Agreement. Appellants merely point out 
that the letter and check are so r.onconforming to the Option 
Agreement, so equivocal, prec-atory, and ambivalent as to 
belie the existence of a mutually binding contract. As 
stated in 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance §35 (1977): 
Before a court may decree specific performance of an 
alleged contract, there must be a valid, binding agree-
ment: Thus it is required that the agreement be a 
concluded or completed contract between the parties to 
the suit. Thus, the court cannot make a contract 
between the parties and then proceed to decree specific 
performance of the contract it has itself made. It 
cannot require the performance of any contract other 
than the one which the parties themselves made. 
Respondents have repeatedly admitted that the 
letter merely expressed an intent to exercise the option and 
almost one year after the purported exercise, stated that 
the property description was "yet to be fully resolved". 
(P.R. 57; R. 114-116) Respondents now claim a binding contract 
was formed by the unsigned letter, which reportedly contained 
exhibits not presently a part of this record. As Respondents 
state, "[t]he proposed annexation plat is not a matter of 
record and what it showed or did not show is a matter of 
conjecture." (RB 37) 
This casual admission that the descriptions 
referred to in that letter are unknown and undemonstrated in 
the record before this Court cannot be overlooked. Where 
Respondents' obligations are reduced to but a matter of 
conjecture, there can be no mutuality. Furthermore, the 
Statute of Frauds would have precluded the assertion of the 
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letter as against Klein. It cannot be said that Respondents 
irrevocably bound themselves. 
P. 2d 303 (Wyo. 1976). In .Crockett, prospective purchasers 
of real estate sued the executrix of a landowner's estate 
for specific performance. The Wyoming Supreme Court found 
the contract to be an option, cited Utah authority for the 
strict compliance standard of exercise, and found a letter 
of intent not absolute enough and not in the proper form to 
be an exercise. The court said specifically that "[o]ne 
cannot enforce a contract not binding upon himself." Id. at 
• 310. 
Likewise, where Klein's acts were !lot in strict 
compliance and are both insufficient to bind him and uncertain 
in the record, there can be no contract. 
POINT VIII 
RESPONDENTS MISCHARACTERIZE THE 
EFFECT OF THE $19,000 PAYMENTS 
Throughout their brief, Respondents have attempted 
to infer that their $19,000 in payments made on the Option 
Agreement have some talismanic effect on its substance or 
somehow bring into consideraton the doctrine of forfeiture. 
(See RB 19, 22, 24, 30) It is clear that payments made to 
maintain an option's existence do not change its terms. 
And, while. Respcndents infer that equity will not allow 
Appellants to accept such pci.ymenls and avoid their obligation, 
this loses sight of the fact that the obligation paid for, 
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that of maintaining the option in good stead through 1971, 
was received. (RB 24) Simply stated, Appellants never 
denied the existence of the option. 
Respondents' reliance on Woolsey v. Brown, 539 
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975) is misplaced. In Woolsey, prior 
acceptance of payments under an existing bilateral land 
contract was held sufficient to effectuate a waiver of 
timely payments, because strict application of that contract's 
forfeiture provisions would result in a loss of the vendor's 
equity and expectation of title under the contract. Because 
such contracts are increasingly used as mortgage substitutes, 
Utah courts have readily buffered their stringent provisions 
to allow purchasers thereunder rights similar to those of a 
mortgagor when a mortgagee seeks to accelerate and declare a 
default. Id., see also Lamont v. Evjen, 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 
P.2d 532 (1973). The rule is a· salutory one. Conversely, 
however: 
An option contract does not come within the equi-
table rule against forfeitures. The question of declaring 
a forfeiture is not involved. An option contract gives 
the optionee a right under the named conditions. If 
those conditions are not met, the optionee does not 
acquire the right. Such a situation involves none of 
the elements of a forfeiture. In deprives no party of 
any right and abrogates no contract, but, on the other 
hand, is but the enforcement of the contract made by 
the parties. Lake Shore Country Club v. Brand, 339 Ill. 
504, 171 N.E. 494, soi (1930). 
The Lake Shore court further pointed out that 
judicial manipulation of an option agreement under the 
pretext of preventing a forfeiture would necessarily violate 
the very essence of an option: 
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A co.urt of equity c::mnot relieve ·~he optionee from 
ttl(o effect of: his failure to '~omply v:. ::L ~:c.2 con di tiun~ 
on which he has been granted tje priv-'..l2\e of ou:ring. 
This '.•ould make a new contrac:: for t:i.2 ru:-::i.e:> and 
comoel the owner to 3ell when he had not a~reed to do 
so.- The optionee must perform all conditi:.,ns precedent 
to his ::i.;;ht to ?Urc:1ase not '''°li.ved by tf:.-e C)ptionor. In 
this res?ecc the ~eni3l of dn option co 9urc~ase pco?er~y 
differs from the forfeiture of property ri6ht3 already 
acquired under a bilateral contract. James on Option 
Contracts (1916) §862. Therefore, unless the appellee 
has met the conditions of the option contract or the 
conditions have been waived, it ~s not eutitlad to 
exercise the option. 171 N.E. at 501. 
As stated in Sim Ltunber Co. v. Thompson Land ,r_,_ 
Goal Co_._, 76 S.E.2d 105 at 110, (W.Va. 195.}), an op·:ion is 
;.10t an i.nterest, but a ~1:::'.'e :··ersonal right, anJ thus there 
is no Lorfeirure. Indeed, ~ppellants' conveyance of 40 acres 
~.i: 1971, then conceci2cl1y 'vorth $28,000, perceived by Hrs. 
:.>2.nciberg a.5 the exercise of >:he option, makes the present: 
rlJim of forfeiture a mischaracterization of the nature of 
t~e option and is purblind to the facts and equities of thi3 
.,. 7 I 
c:is2.·--
.\ppellants firmly ·oelieve that several leg;il issues 
aa to which 1·1,ere are n~ :=elevan: factual issues a:=e decisive 
in their favor, ar.d that this Court must enter judgment in 
tl"l"'ii:- "Eavor. Alternatively, t:1e presence of faclual issues 
requires reruand of this cas~ fo7 triol. 
Respectfully submi~tec this 23th day of December, 
1977. 
- ) ,I -
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cc 
FINDING/CONCUJS 
No. SUbstance 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
20 Real property optioned to Klein is 
Estate Purchase Contract. 
.ct. 
lil 
21 Real Estate Purchase Contract consiier 
funey Receipt and Option Agreerrent aaterial 
consideration, and all other tenIJ.S. 
23 $68,359.04 was full payment for the 
28 Fence survey & Real Estate Purchase !XLPr• 
are consistent with Earnest 'ltlney P-
ITEnt, and observation by the pa.,.· 
dispute' or armiguity in larv· 
30 Earnest funey Receip~ 
unambiguous. Kl.e.f 
31 On June 7, l~ 
down payment. 
32 Option Agreerrent 
to agree. 
33 Deed of 40 acres die 
indicated total exerc. 
34 Mrs. Sandberg waived t~ 
requesting delcry in surv 
37 Klein expended time, energy 
38 Equity requires performance. 
CDNCLUSIONS OF I.AW: 
1 Earnest funey Receipt & Option Agreerlictory. 
unarrbiguous and enforceable. Klein E 
:erta:in. 
2 Mrs. Sandberg did not object to condi 
June 7, 1973; requested delay in sun 
legal descriptions or terms of Real E 
Contract and has waived all objection 
3 Klein has fully perfonred and is enti 
perforrmnce. 
~ 
AB 53-63 
AB 87-91 
AB 86-95 
AB 94-95 
AB 62 
\B 53-63 
~ 27-32 
'\-63 
·n 
44 hei"ei-n 
26 herein 
Footnote 16 herein 
AB 53-63 
AB 86-95 
AB 64-77 
20 herein 
44 herein 
43 herein 
AB 64-77 
AB 86-95 
AB 41-51;61 
* References in regular type are to issue1d therefore treated 
in Appellants' Brief. Italicized ref eris, treated herein. 
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TABLE I 
CDRREI.ATION OF APPELUINI'S I ARGUMENTS wrrn SECDND FINDINGS AND CDNCLUSIONS * 
FINDING/CDNCLlJSION 
S stance 
[NGS OF FACT: 
Real property optioned to Klein is as described in Real 
Estate Purchase Contract. 
Real Estate Purchase Contract consistent with Earnest 
M:mey Receipt and Option Agreement as to legal description 
consideration, and all other terms. 
$68,359.04 was full payment for the 431.84 acres. 
Fence survey & Real Estate Purchase c.ontract descriptions 
are consistent with Earnest M:mey Receipt, Option Agree-
uent, and observation by the parties. No discrepancy, 
dispute, or arri>iguity in land description. 
Earnest M:mey Receipt & Option Agreenent are clear and 
unambiguous. Klein tirrely perfonned all obligations. 
On June 7, 1971, Klein exercised the option by making the 
down payment. 
Option AgreeIIEilt not vague or ambiguous; not an agreement 
to agree. 
Deed of 40 acres did not indicate 40-acre exercise, but 
indicated total exercise. 
Mrs. Sandberg waived timely preparation of contract by 
requesting d.elay in survey which d.eZayed contract. 
f Klein e:rpend.ed time, energy and money in reliance on exercise. 
• 'Equity requires performance. 
llil.USIOOS OF IAW: 
l Earnest M:mey Receipt & Option Agreement are valid, 
unanhiguous and enforceable. Klein exercised the option. 
I Mrs. Sandberg did not object to conduct of Klein prior to 
Jwze 7, 1973; requested d.eZay in survey, never objected to 
legal d.escriptions or terms of Real Estate Purchase 
Contract and has waived all objections and is estopped. 
a Klein has fully perfonned and is entitled to specific 
performance. 
i: 
SUbstance 
Land subject to option not clear; descriptions contradict. 
Real Estate Purchase Contract does not conform to Option 
Agreement as to land description. 
Real Estate Purchase Contract does not conform with other 
documents as to description, consideration, and other material 
terms. 
The arr:ount is $1,000 short. 
There is no evidence the fence surveyed is the one referred 
to in the docurnents. 
Descriptions contradict. 
Statute of Frauds bars parol evidence. 
Earnest M:mey Receipt & Option Agreement descriptions are 
different. 
Klein did not tirrely exercise. 
The "exercise" was inproper, equivocal, untirrely, and 
tentative. 
Option Agreement clearly required the agreenent of the parties 
as to partial exercise,.which agreerrent has not occurred. 
Conveyance evidences exercise as to only 40 acres. 
Mrs. Sandberg could not waive on behalf of alZ plaintiffs; 
waiver of essential teI'l11 not possible; d.eZay of survey did 
not delay contract. 
Acts are insufficient to show part performance. 
Equity does not favor Respond.ents. 
Land descriptions are unenforceably arri>iguous & contradictory. 
No real estate contract was submitted until 1972. 
The "exercising letter" was precatory, ambivalent & uncertain. 
No such waiver occurred. 
Waiver of material terms impossible. 
Children, as parties, waived nothing. 
Klein has failed to perform in: 
properly exercising. 
tender of conforming contract, 
obtaining agreem:mt as to exercise, 
~ 
AB 53-63 
AB 87-91 
AB 86-95 
AB 94-95 
AB 62 
AB 53-63 
AB 27-32 
AB 53-63 
AB 73-77 
AB 64-77 
AB 41-51;61 
Footnote 10 herein 
44 herein 
25 herein 
Footnote 16 herein 
AB 53-63 
AB 86-95 
AB 64-77 
20 herein 
44 herein 
43 herein 
AB 64-77 
AB 86-95 
AB 41-51;61 
JReferences in regular type are to issues raised in the first set of findings and conclusions as well as the second set, and therefore treated in Appellants' Brief. Italicized references are to issues raised for the first tine in the second findings and conclusions, treated herein. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitizatio  provided by the In titute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Earnest MJney Receipt 
All land owned by the sellers in 
Sections 21, 22 and 27, T™11Ship 
42 South, Range 15 West, S.L.M., 
consisting, so far as the parties 
can detennine at this ti.rre of 
approximately 500 acres not in-
cluding any water or water rights, 
and less the following: 
There is now a reservoir constructed 
by the City of St. George on what 
the parties believe to be the NE 1/4 
NE 1/4 of Section 22, and there is 
an old fence running north and south 
west of this reservoir. 1he sellers 
intend to reserve from said sale all 
land in said Section 22 which lies 
east of said fence line, it being 
understood that the exact line will 
have to be detennined if and when 
the option hereinafter IIEiltioned is 
executed. 
Section 22 
1. Reservoir in NE 1/4 NE 1/4 
Section 22. 
2. Fence North and Southwest of 
reservoir. 
3. Exclusion of all land in 
Section 22 east of fence. 
TABLE II 
CXl1PARISON OF I.AND DE.SCRIPITONS 
Option Agreemmt 
[A]ll land owned by the Sellers in 
Section 21, Section 22, and Sec-
tion 27 of Township 42 South, Range 
15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
consisting of approximately 500 
acres, which property shall be IIDre 
particularly described in Schedule A 
attached hereto, to be signed by the 
parties and made a part hereof for 
all purposes; not including any water 
or water rights, and excluding all 
land in the Northeast one quarter of 
the northeast one quarter of Section 
22, which lies East of the old fence 
line, which runs North and Southwest 
of the City of St. George reservoir, 
said excluded property also to be 
IIDre particularly described in 
Schedule A attached hereto and made 
a part hereof for all purposes. 
NE 1/4 NE 1/4 
NE 1/4 Sec. 22 
Section 22 
1. Reservoir not specifically 
located. 
2. Fence north and southwest of 
reservoir. 
3. Exclusion of land east of fence 
only in NE 1/4 NE 1/2 Secticn 22. 
4. No Schedule A exists. 
Armexation Plat 
All of the NE 1/4 Section 22, Less that 
portion within Washington City. 
All of the NW 1/4 Section 22 lying south 
of Interstate Highway 15. 
All of the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 and E 1/2 SW 1/4 
Section 22. 
All of the E 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 21 lying 
south of Interstate Highway 15. 
NE l/ 4 SE l/ 4 Section 21. 
All of Sectional lots 1 & 2 Section 27. 
All being located in T. 42S., R.15W., Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
(R. 109 (emphasis added)) . 
1. 
2. 
3. 
(Entirety of Section 
22 annexed to City 
of St. George, except 
portion in City of 
Washington.) 
Section 22 
No reservoir is mentioned. 
No fence is IIEltioned. 
No exclusion. 
I City of 
Washington 
Real Estate Purchase c.ontract 
1he following described property located in Washington 
County, State of Utah, Township 42 South, Range 15 West: 
Section 22: SE 1/4 SW 1/4; NE 1/4 SW 1/4; NW 1/4 SW 1/4; 
SE 1/4 NW 1/4; NE 1/4 NW 1/4; also 
Beginning at an existing fence line at its intersection 
with the North line of Section 22, T42S, Rl5W, SLBC.M, 
which point is 12. 2 feet west from a stone m:n.md mrrking 
the NE comer NW 1/4 NE 1/4 said Section 22 and running 
thence S 0°14'W 1338.5 feet along said fence line, thence 
S 89°36'30" E 433.0 feet along said fence, thence S 10° 
09'30" W 405.0 feet along said fence, thence S 83°49'30" 
W 107.0 feet along said fence, thence S 12°40'10" W 
910. 49 feet, rrore or less, along said fence to the Souu" 
line NE 1/4 said Section 22, thence west 1380 feet to the 
SW comer said NE 1/4, thence north 2640 feet to the N 
1/4 corner said Section 22, thence east 1307.8 feet to 
the point of beginning. c.ontaining 86. 84 acres, m::Jre or 
less. 
Section 21: SE 1/4 NE 1/4; NE 1/4 SE 1/4. 
Section 27: All of sectional lot 1 consisting of approxi-
mately 19 acres; all of sectional lot 2 consisting of 
approximately 42 acres. 
All of said property consisting of approximately 431.34 
acres. (R. 328). 
Section 22 
1. No IIEltion of reservoir. 
2. A fence is located. 
reserved 
to Mrs. 
Sandberg 
3. Exclusion in both NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 of NE 1/4, 
Section 22. 
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FOOTNOTES 
l/ This Order was on its face a final one and twenty-
one days had passed since its entry when Appellants filed 
their notic~ under Rule 73 U.R;C.P. 
~/ The lower court entered a formal Order to this 
effect on June 6, 1977. 
ll The procedural irregularity noted by Respondents on 
page 4 of their brief was caused primarily by their tender of 
a second Order to the lower court contrary to the dictates of 
the Order docketed March 25, 1977. Regardless of the cause 
of the irregularity, however, Respondents' proposition that 
Appellants' appeal from the Order entered on April 19, 1977 
should be dismissed has been previously heard by this Court 
and denied. 
~/ In appeals from equitable actions, it becomes both 
the duty and the prerogative of the Supreme Court to review 
both the law and the facts and to make its own findings and 
substitute its jurlgment for that of the trial court. Mitchell 
v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). Furthermore, every 
inference and every position arguable on behalf of the 
Appellant must be taken by this Court. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 
542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
21 Respondents' counsel dismissed this assertion as a 
"professional insult from some rather inexperienced counsel." 
(Transcript May 25, 1977 at 10:25-26) 
~/ It should be noted that one affidavit was stipulated 
to as "uncontroverted" for purposes of both motions. That 
affidavit was the one submitted and filed by Wanda Sandberg 
on March 15, 1977, the morning of the hearing below. (T. at 
7:12-15, R. 399; Affidavit at R. 355) Ultimately, it may be 
that the lower court misconstrued the parties' stipulation 
on Mrs. Sandberg's affidavit and instead attached the "uncon-
troverted" label to Klein's affidavit filed one month earlier. 
(R. 337-348; Order R. 359) This is the only plausible 
explanation the Appellants can offer for the court's "findings". 
2/ Respondents' counsel represented to the lower court 
that he mailed the proposed findings "about ten days" before 
they were signed. (Transcript of Testimony, May 25, 1977 at 
8:24-25) 
§_/ Appellants strenuously object to Respondents' refer-
ence to "acknowledged writings" in Respondents' Brief at 18. 
None of these writings are acknowledged. 
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21 Respondents rely on five cases in support of their 
statement. Three of them (Wafn~r v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 
482 P.2d 702 (1970), In Re Ek er's Esta;~. 19 Utah 2d 414, 
412 P.2d 45 (1967), Rite:c v. Ca_yia~, l9 Utah 2d 358, 431 
p. 2d 788 (J 967)) werec.?:sesl:nwhich the plaintiff attempted 
on appeal to present a nc:w theory of recovery"-:---Tnese same 
three cases and another case (Sta i:e By anu Throud1 Road 
Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah NH295, 49.) P.ZCf"tlTTTI"972)) 
were appeals following a trial on the merits with full 
development of issues. In the ot~~r c~se cited, (Thl9r3on 
Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, .>08 P.2d 528~ 7 }), 
the Court noted that the issue sought to he raised for the 
first time on appeal was presented in another related case. 
lO/ In this case, the conveyance of l+O acres to Respond-
ents in 1971 may be alleged to be part performance. Obviously, 
from the citation of Glass, acts of Mrs. Sandberg are not 
part performance. In--ract, the Gl~~ court spe~ificalry--
said that the conveyance of a portion of the land is neither 
a part performance, nor is it a recognit~on of the alleged 
oral contract so far as it relates to the remaining land not 
included in the deed. On the contrary, it is in distinct 
disregard and implied disavowal of such a contract. Glass, 
~. at 29. Obviously, alleged partial conveyances-always 
oeg-t11e question; part of what? The whole, by conveyance 
of part, can hardly be determined. 
ll/ Respondents object to Appellants' reliance on the 
annex.s.tion plat (included in the record as an Exhibit by 
Respondents) when the March 30, 1971, letter refers to the 
EI_Qposed annexation plat. (RB 37) Respondents apparently 
Inter that the proposed annexation plat, referred to on 
March 30, 1971, is a materially different document than the 
annexation plat which bears a surveyor's certificate dated 
April 5, 1971, only 5 days later. Appellants feel that 
Respondents, who bore the burden of proof below, would have 
included such an exhibit were it probative. Appellants have 
never seen it. 
12/ Th' . ' f 1 . .c 11 
- is concession is ata even i~ Appe ants were to 
concede the conformity of land descriptions. 
l3/ T h' o • • 1 ' ' f h b 
- i.n is initia petition be ore t e pro ate court, 
Respondent recited prior payments of $19, 000. (Probate 
r~cord at 55) Su?sequently, but as part of the same peti-
tion, ~esponuent incongruously recited prior payments 
totalling $20,000 (Id. at 61) From this point forward 
Appellants sought dIScovery on the consideration rnatter, 
contending ~h~t all the ma~ters presented in Respondent's 
probate peti~ion were' essent:i.cilly in dispute. (Id. 103) 
Appellants file? a separate complaint seeking to quiet title 
to the land claimed by Respondent and specifically alleged 
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failure of consideration as a ground for voiding the Option 
Agreement. (R. 1) Thereafter in interrogatories to Avalon 
Klein, Appellants attempted to ascertain whether any payment 
was alleged to have made were made by parties other than 
Respondent Robert Klein. (R. 17-19) Royal K. Hunt, Esq., 
acting as counsel for Appellants, requested any and all 
information by and through which the Defendant and Respond-
ent Robert D. Klein based his conclusion regarding a tender 
of full performance of the conditions for exercise of the 
Option Agreeuent. (R. 25-27) Respondent's answers referred 
to the earlier petition in the probate case referred to 
supra, which was disputed. (R. 28-31) Unsatisfied with the 
response, Appellants then submitted a request for admissions 
to Respondent Klein detailing payment by payment the $17,000 
paid between June 14, 1962 and December 14, 1970, pursuant 
to the terms of the Option Agreement. (R. 55-56) In his 
answers to requests for admissions, Klein verified what 
Appellants thought true, that insufficient funds had been 
tendered. (R. 66-67) During discovery, Respondent Klein 
had marital difficulties and a second wife, Frances Klein, 
was requested to admit or deny whether she made any addi-
tional payments on the Option Agreement. Her responses 
indicate that she offered no additional consideration. (R. 
128-131.) Ultimately Respondent Klein moved before the court 
for permission to file a counterclaim. (R. 164-165) The 
counterclaim alleges that payments were made as required 
under the option agreement and that Klein timely tendered 
"the full purchase price" for the real property allegedly 
contained in the Option Agreement. (R. 166-168, particularly 
'a 4 & 6) 
14/ For example, his memorandum before the lower court 
clearly recites that only $19,000 had previously been paid 
under the Option Agreement. (R. 286, 288) 
15/ See footnote 12, supra; Appellants' Brief at 94-95. 
161 Respondents' contention that the option did not 
specify who was to prepare the contract is inane. The law 
places the burden of exercising - accepting the offer - on 
the optionee. Lincoln Land and Development Co. v. Thompson, 
26 Utah 2d 324, 487 P.2d 426 (1971). Obviously the Respond-
ents were to prepare the contract. Were Appellants expected 
to prepare the contract and have it waiting in case he 
desired to exercise? The Option Agreement specifically 
provided that Respondents could apply such costs to the 
purchase price. (Paragraph 5(h), R. 61) 
171 Respondents assert that the description on the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract they tendered was consistent with 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Option Agreement "according to 
the parties' understanding thereof". (RB 10) Respondents 
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" 
fail to state that Mrs. Sandberg has previously indicated 
she never understood what Respondents intended, and it is 
clear that she never.indicated to either the St. George City 
Council or the Washington County Corrunission that Respondent 
.K.'..cin had exercised the Op ti 01~ Agreement, as Klein has 
dairned. (AnWS No. 17, R. 137; Anlil+RK Nos. 3a & b, R. 152) 
Further, Respondent Klein has previously claimed under 
oath that "[h)e was buying approximately 450 acres ~ 
described in Holidaire Lands annexation plat." (No. 3c, Id.; 
R. 152-153; Plat R. 109) On appeal, however, he contends 
that that plat also depicts contiguous property that he is 
not purchasing. (RB 9; Plat. R. 109) It is little wonder 
that Respondents, in alleging all these descriptions to be 
identical, cont~~.ally refer this Court to the findings of 
fact entered by the lower court instead of the actual 
documents in the record on appeal. The findings conform in 
large part to the conclusory affidavit filed by Respondent 
Klein on February 14, 1977. (R. 337-345; 369-380) 
Respondents' contentions that Appellants orally agreed 
to the surveyor's description prepared in 1972 are both 
inunaterial and without foundation. Davison v. Robbins, 30 
Utah 2d 333, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). Mrs. Sandberg-rscinly 
understanJing was that the land ultimately agreed to be 
somewhere within the boundary demarked b_y the fenceline 
and not coextensive with it. (AnWS No. 9, R. l3Lj:J 
Respondents also state that Mrs. Sandberg represented 
to third parties after December of 1971 that Respondent 
Klein had purchased "the property". (RB 11-12) The basis 
for this "finding" is Mrs. Sandberg's deposition, R. 398, at 
pages 51-52. A reading of these pages reveals that both Mr. 
Klein's counsel and Mrs. Sandberg got confused at the 
deposition and had to begin this series of questions over. 
~- at 52:18-20) Ultimately, Mrs. Sandberg could only 
recall statements made before December 1971. (Id. at 52) 
Furtho:.rmo:i:,~. Respondent Klein's own affidavit confirms that 
Mrs. Sar1dberg refused to discuss the option with him after 
December of 1971. (U9, R~ 341-342) Klein's omniscience 
apparently allows him co testify at will as to Mrs. Sandberg's 
"understanding". · Mrs. Sandberg unfortunately is not equally 
gifted and has indicated her failure to comprehend Klein's 
intentions, affirmatively testifying that no agreement was 
ever made in June of 1971.· (AnWS No. 17, R. 137; DWS, R. 
298 at 30:12-19) 
Lastly, Respondents quote Mrs. Sandberg as stating that 
she and the Respondent "walked out on the fence and that at 
that time she was insisting that the meandering fence was 
the boundary of the property she was selling, and. that 
Respondent agreed thereto." (RB 24, citing DHS, R. 398 at 
14-15) There is no such quote. 
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